Arash Azizi these days has one eye on today and another on tomorrow. The historian follows the evolution of the Epic Fury operation from the United States while trying to finish his essay Counterweights: Iran, Israel, and the Battle for the Middle East. "It's the curse of working on a matter with so many repercussions in the present," admits via video call the professor who teaches at Yale University and writes analyses for The Atlantic. "I am currently writing about the Shah. How did Iran relate to Israel before and after the 1967 war? How did it rebuild its ties with the Arab world? The end of this book could be very different when I finish it," he says, with a deadline for the end of this year and publication for the following year. Previously, he had analyzed the figure of Commander Soleimani and the Woman, Life, Freedom movement in separate works.
What did you think when the attacks began 14 days ago?
I had a very bad feeling about the war. I knew it would have unpredictable consequences and many of them would not be good. I am aware that the goal is the democratic transition in Iran, which is also what I want. Also, an eventual reconciliation between Iran, the United States, and Israel, and the regional integration of Iran. However, this war will not facilitate this process. That being said, I maintain a cautious hope that in the future, the policies of Ayatollah Jamenei, which have been truly disastrous, will be left behind.
How do you see the conflict at this moment?
President Trump wanted a quick victory and a conventional confrontation, and he has not had it. At the same time, Iran considers that if it takes another position, it will be exposed to new attacks in the future, so it has rejected the U.S.'s calls for negotiation. The regime has done quite well so far because all it had to do was survive, but the issue of attrition is definitely on the table. Israel may continue to attack, leading to further deterioration of Iranian infrastructure. If the war ends now, the regime could declare that it has won. They would say, 'We maintained leadership after the transition' [from Ali to Mojtaba Jamenei]. However, they would have to face a devastated economy and terrible future prospects. On the other hand, if the war ends in a situation similar to the current one, Trump could be seen as a loser. Very close allies of the president, like Mark Dubowitz, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), now argue that the goal was not regime change, but degradation. They are trying to present it as a victory, but it will be difficult for them. Many would not see it that way, and that would likely irritate Trump and may influence future decisions.
What message does the nomination of Mojtaba Jamenei convey?
Mojtaba was chosen to convey a message of continuity. But, at the same time, it is not just about continuity because power resides in the Revolutionary Guard and other collective leadership bodies of the regime, such as the National Security Council. It was known that Mojtaba was well positioned. He has taken on leadership while in the hospital or wherever, which means his power will be limited. So, even though they present it as continuity, his election is somewhat of a break. From the first message he addressed to the Iranian people, it can be deduced that the regime lacks initiative, that it has nothing new to say. It had the same gloomy tone as always: 'We will destroy Israel.' It threatened the countries in the region where there are U.S. military bases without offering its own citizens any hope beyond war.
What did the regime learn from the Twelve-Day War?
It learned that Trump and Netanyahu have divergent interests. It learned that Trump likes quick declarations of victory and is concerned about long wars. Iran is betting on creating a gap between the U.S. and Israel. If you read the messages in X from Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, president of the Iranian Parliament, you can perfectly deduce this. Added to this is the fact that part of Trump's base is openly anti-Israeli. Even antisemitic. It learned that it could replace its commanders if they were eliminated and have a decentralized army with the DMD strategy. What it did not learn is that it was an opportunity to rebuild ties with the people and improve relations with other countries, although many advised them to do so. The regime does not have a strategic vision that involves making things better. It is focused on persecuting opponents and perpetuating itself in power at any cost.
The opposition to the Iranian regime was brutally repressed in the streets weeks before the attacks began. Does a war of attrition benefit or harm it?
The hypothesis of a change by a sector of the Iranian opposition had to do with the duration of the war. Those critics thought that after being hit, the regime would weaken, leading to an uprising. Advisors to Reza Pahlavi like Saeed Ghasseminejad imagine a popular uprising against the regime supported by the U.S. and Israel, perhaps with some armed elements among their ranks. This would lead to the fall of the regime and a dramatic moment like that of February 1979. I do not find it very plausible. I am not clear on how they plan to reach that scenario. Other sectors of the opposition, to which I feel closer, more democratic in nature, always believed that war is bad news. It militarizes the situation, securitizes it. In a militarized context, there are weapons, and we do not have them. So the current situation is not good news. Some hoped that the removal of Ali Jamenei would be. They openly advocated for people like [Nobel Peace Prize winner] Shirin Ebadi. I think they were shortsighted. If the opposition wants to come to power, it needs organization and political initiative, and it has neither.
Could this conflict become the most significant confrontation in the modern history of the Islamic world?
There is a risk that it could worsen and involve more countries in the region. The United Arab Emirates, for example, could challenge Iran's sovereignty over its three islands in the Persian Gulf [Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb], perhaps with the help of the U.S. and Israel. A ground intervention could occur at some point, complicating things. Kurdish forces from inside or outside of Iran could enter the conflict, to which the regime could respond with reprisals. Of course, any attack on Turkey would involve NATO... A French soldier has already died in Iraqi Kurdistan, so it is possible that it could become a war on multiple fronts. I trust that we do not reach that scenario and that the situation de-escalates. The countries in the Middle East do not want war. They did not start it; it was the U.S. and Israel. They are trapped. They see it that way too and want to avoid confrontation.