The figure of Roxane Farmanfarmaian combines the historical weight of her lineage and the experience she holds. Her father, Manucher Mirza Farmanfarmaian, was a member of the Qajar dynasty, which ruled in Iran until it was deposed in 1925 by Reza Shah and, as an expert oil engineer and Iran's representative, was one of the signatories of the so-called Cairo Agreement of 1959, which would lead to the creation a year later of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
Roxane's father became a persona non grata for the new authorities in Tehran during the 1979 revolution, of which she, however, was an exceptional witness as a journalist.
The expert in Iran and the Middle East was, for years, the director of the International Affairs Journal at the University of Cambridge in the United Kingdom, where she now serves as the head of International Studies and Global Politics.
Farmanfamaian is also the author of several books on the history of the Iranian nation, including the memoirs of her father, Blood and Oil: Memoirs of a Persian Prince.
Question. What do you think about the joint offensive by the United States and Israel against Iran?
Answer. The Israelis had been saying for years that Iran was on the verge of obtaining a nuclear bomb. Netanyahu said it in 2012 at the UN [the first time he mentioned it was in 1992] and then repeated it in subsequent years. He always said it was a matter of a year or months. It has been a plan [to attack Iran] that they have maintained for years and could not implement because they could not convince the US presidents to support them. That changed with Trump. The new president, at first, focused on negotiations, but after talking to Netanyahu, he changed his mind, even when negotiations were progressing. He went from accepting that Iran had enriched uranium at 3.5% [the level used in nuclear power plants worldwide] to demanding 0%. This caused the dialogue to fail. The Iranians saw it as a trap. Israel realized it was the ideal time to attack. They had never supported the negotiations. They did not want to just eliminate the nuclear program, but to destabilize the regime; they wanted to change it. Israel cannot claim to be against nuclear proliferation when it has hundreds of nuclear bombs. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) offers you some protection, but Iran has been attacked by two nuclear powers. I think the credibility of the NPT has been severely damaged.
Q. Do you think that, after Iran's latest response, the conflict has ended?
A. I think what happened was part of a carefully orchestrated choreography. Iran had to respond, but they warned Qatar and the United States. That's why they closed the airspace, deployed anti-missile batteries, evacuated the US embassy, and ultimately, there were no casualties. It was a symbolic gesture that did not seek escalation. The only question is: what happens now? Iran will not accept negotiations that include the total elimination of any uranium enrichment. Also, they do not trust Trump. They accuse him of withdrawing from the nuclear deal [in 2018] and now pretending to negotiate while preparing to bomb. On the other hand, Israel says it has achieved its military objectives, but that is highly questionable.
Q. How do you explain the Western interest in the Iranian nuclear program when the only country in the Middle East that deceived international inspectors to build a nuclear arsenal was Israel, as history recalls? Can we talk about hypocrisy?
A. Of course. Iran has always been the target of this double standard. The UN has not even declared that Iran has been attacked, nor has it condemned what constitutes a clear violation of international law. Netanyahu was very clear that the West would not react to an attack on Iran, just as it did not react to Israel's actions in Gaza.
Q. It is curious because the Iranian nuclear program started with the help of the United States and with the full acquiescence of Israel. Isn't that true?
A. Indeed. It started during the shah's era under the 'Atoms for Peace' program [launched by then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953]. The perspective that Iran should not even have civilian nuclear power plants is based solely on a political view: the memory of the US hostage crisis (1979) and the fact that it is a pariah country. It is obvious that Iran is not completely innocent and has acted illegally, but it is also true that the law is not applied to it as in other cases, even when it is the country subjected to the strictest inspections in the world.
Q. Why is the nuclear program so important for Iran?
A. It is a matter of pure political influence. It took them nearly 70 years to establish an effective nuclear program, when most countries that obtained nuclear bombs did so in four or five years. It is not a technical issue, but a political one. They had to decide what the goal was, and they did not reach that until after the war with Iraq ended [1988]. The initial plan was directed against Iraq, and that's why the military nuclear program developed in the 1990s concluded in 2003 [after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime]. The subsequent development of enriched uranium was very slow. They did not start enriching uranium to 60% until Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear deal. And I believe the purpose is to have it as a bargaining chip: to deliver it in exchange for lifting the sanctions they have been suffering for nearly half a century.
Q. The US Intelligence services confirmed in March that Iran does not have any nuclear program for military purposes, but they also cannot explain the presence of the 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium that Tehran has accumulated and that has almost no civilian use. Do you have any theory about this?
A. Having that amount of enriched uranium at that level makes no sense unless it is intended for military purposes. But I believe the goal is to use it as a bargaining chip: to deliver it in exchange for lifting the sanctions.
Q. Is it possible that this war reinforces the position of the most radical sectors of the regime, the internal voices that are already calling for Iran to have atomic weapons?
A. We do not know. What the Foreign Minister, [Abbas] Araghchi, said is that Iran will not stop its nuclear program and that these recent attacks have not significantly damaged Iranian capabilities. Perhaps they have delayed them by a few months or at most a year. The Iranian nuclear program has not been "obliterated," as Trump said. Iran has a large community of scientists, experts in this sector. That is what the Iranian education system has focused on, more than Humanities. It is their pride. The knowledge will remain.
Q. You yourself believe that Israel sought a regime change, but it seems that, far from achieving it, we have seen both internal and external opposition groups expressing total rejection of the Israeli aggression. Nobel Prize winner Narges Mohammadi said that "democracy, human rights, and freedom are not achieved through bombs." Has the Israeli offensive had the opposite effect?
A. For Western media, whenever there are protests in Iran, it means that the people want to overthrow the regime. We always say that protests in Spain or France do not mean that people want to subvert the government system, although they do call for changes. There are millions of Iranians who support the regime. But Israel never thought that the reaction of the opponents would be similar to that expression: 'We have disagreements in the family, but we are still family.' That is why they rallied around the flag.
Q. To what extent does the Iranian nationalist reaction you speak of, to the attacks by Israel and the US, still rely on the legacy left by the CIA-backed coup in 1953 against democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh? Or is it an old story for the population?
A. No, it is a very current story in Iran. They remember that the United States betrayed Iran. Washington thought it knew Tehran and had an excellent relationship with the shah. Then came the hostage crisis [when Iran seized 66 Americans for 444 days], which was fundamental for the relations between both countries. It was a real shock for the United States, and since then, they have always perceived Iran as a hostile country.
Q. Why have the pro-Iranian groups in the region not been activated to support Tehran, except in the case of the Houthis in Yemen?
A. In the West, these groups are seen as part of the Iranian military structure, but Tehran sees them differently. Iran does not have an air force, so it had to design an alternative military structure to protect itself. That is why they have so many missiles and drones. They also developed what they call "advanced defense," and these formations fall under that category. Iran never saw them as part of its army, but as allies with a common cause. When Israel attacked its embassy in Damascus [in April 2024], Tehran realized that this strategy no longer worked and started responding directly with missiles.
Q. Since the current crisis began, we have seen the return of Reza Pahlavi, son of the last shah, presenting himself as an alternative to the ayatollah regime. Does he have support among opposition circles?
A. No. There are always nostalgics, but the support he has is minimal. He is incompetent. He does not have any significant organization backing him. He only appears in times of crisis. During the last women's protests, he decided to visit Israel [in April 2023], confirming suspicions among many that he may simply be an Israeli agent. There are many factions in Iranian society. There are extremists; reformists who want to change the regime from within; and those who support a more influential civil society, seeking absolute change. But there is no majority group. The diaspora is completely incompetent. They only know how to fight among themselves.
Q: You witnessed the Iranian revolution of 1979, which was an uprising against a dictatorship, that of the Shah, and ended in another, the autocracy of Khomeini. What happened to reach that point?
A: Unfortunately, it is something very common with revolutions. The revolution was hijacked under the influence of the war between Iran and Iraq [which broke out in September 1980]. Without that factor, many people would not have supported the clerical leadership. Under those circumstances, Khomeini emerged as a strong leader and mobilized all that religious argumentation to support the conflict. It was then that the Revolutionary Guard was created, and the country headed in a completely different direction. When the war ended, Iran was already dominated by a dictatorship.