United States, Hungary, Slovakia, France, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal... Liberal democracy is in crisis. The far-right or populist right achieve spectacular electoral results, govern many states, or have displaced traditional center-right or center-left parties to the third position or beyond.
Ralf Dahrendorf, a German sociologist, political scientist, and economist, Prince of Asturias Award winner in 2007, predicted back in 1998 that the 21st century could be "the century of authoritarianism." Given the current international drift, many experts now agree that he may have been right on target.
In June, the ultranationalist Karol Nawrocki won the presidential elections in Poland with over 50% of the votes. In Romania, the pro-Russian ultra George Simion lost the elections in May but obtained 41% of the votes. And in Portugal, on May 18, the far-right party Chega became the second party in the neighboring country, surpassing the Socialist Party.
These are just three examples from the last 60 days. But in recent years, there have been dozens. Election after election, the far-right or radical right is advancing in their various national forms. From the victory of Donald Trump with a populist discourse to the spectacular rise of Alternative for Germany (AfD) or National Rally in France, which have become opposition leaders.
The turning point, according to several scholars of the phenomenon, occurred in 2016 when the first victory of Trump in the United States, the Brexit referendum that broke the European Union (EU), and the consolidation of autocrat Vladimir Putin in Russia coincided.
Four European Union states are governed by the populist right -Belgium, Slovakia, Hungary, and Italy- and in eight, the main opposition party is far-right or hard-right -Germany, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovenia, France, Poland, Portugal, and Romania-.
In the Netherlands, the ultra-Islamophobic Geert Wilders won the elections in 2023. His party led the Dutch government for 11 months, and last month he left and broke the coalition for not being able to implement "the most restrictive immigration policy in history." There are as many examples as countries.
"We are witnessing a clear advance of authoritarian leaders," explains Xavier Casals, a Ph.D. in Contemporary History from the University of Barcelona and an expert in the far-right, to EL MUNDO. This entails "a wear and tear of representative democracy" and "a crisis of the forces that have sustained the system, social democrats, and Christian democrats." So much so that many have become third or fourth forces or have fallen into a marginal position, as was the case with The Republicans in France (the traditional right-wing party in France).
Casals highlights the importance of the role that center-right or right-wing parties adopt in relation to the populist right. In some cases, they "draw a clear line with the far-right, as in Germany" [the famous cordon sanitaire], but they can also "embrace their proposals," as the British Conservative Party partly did, which is now being overtaken by the populism of Nigel Farage (Reform UK) in many constituencies and in some polls. This second strategy "does not yield good results because, as Jean-Marie Le Pen said, voters prefer the original over the copy." And that happened with the former National Front (now National Rally) against The Republicans.
Arjum Appadurai, an anthropologist and professor at New York University, detailed seven years ago in The Great Regression that there are "strong indications" that "there is a worldwide rejection of liberal democracy and its replacement by some form of populist authoritarianism." Appadurai believes that "democratic fatigue" has put European liberal democracy on the brink of a dangerous crisis.
Experts warn that this "democratic fatigue" is bringing to power parties that openly or more subtly oppose liberal democracy. The most paradigmatic example in the European Union is that of Viktor Orban in Hungary.
Raquel García, a researcher at the Elcano Royal Institute specializing in the EU, points out in a conversation with this newspaper two main reasons for this success: the "wear and tear of traditional parties, which for years have not provided an adequate response to citizens' problems" and, at the same time, "the optimal management of the agenda by far-right parties, which find scapegoats" to blame for all evils. Normally, immigrants, national minorities, or even the European Union itself.
García notes that populist parties "emerge from discontent" and "erode further when in power because they do not solve the problems that propelled their growth," as has happened in the Netherlands with the PVV (Wilders' party), which, as it fell in the polls, decided to break the coalition government and force a new election.
Experts agree that the phenomenon is not new in itself, but it is in its intensity. Cas Mudde, a Dutch political scientist and professor at the University of Georgia (United States) and at the Center for Research on Extremism in Oslo, points out that we are currently in "the fourth wave of the far-right, which began in 2000," especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks in New York.
This wave, the most successful worldwide for these parties so far, is characterized by "the normalization and mainstreaming" of these parties. Mudde adds that far-right ideas are sometimes advocated by new parties and, other times, they succeed by radicalizing traditional center-right and right-wing parties," as has happened with the Republican Party in the United States, which has now been taken over by the MAGA movement (Make America Great Again) of Donald Trump.
The rise of populist movements is being accompanied by a very significant advance of the right worldwide. In Portugal, the legislative elections on May 18 resulted in the most right-wing Assembly of the Republic in its democratic history, with 70% of its deputies being center-right, liberals, or far-right, while the left, divided into six parties, was reduced to the remaining 30%.
Casals acknowledges that in recent years there has been a clear global shift to the right, although with nuances in different countries. In many European states, the axis of elections is no longer right-left, but right-far-right. This is now the case in France, Germany, and as recently seen in the elections in Romania or Poland.
Where do all these new votes come from? Many come from abstention: an electorate frustrated with politicians who find an anti-political and anti-establishment candidate who encourages them to go to the polls. Others come from the right, such as the vote in defense of a national identity perceived as threatened by immigration or Islam. But the radical right also has a significant vote that previously leaned towards the left.
Writer, journalist, and editor Manuel Florentín, who has dedicated part of his work to this phenomenon, considers that rather than asking about the rise of the far right, one should ask what the left has done wrong for the working class to vote for them. Florentín recalls that when the founder of the National Front (FN), Jean-Marie Le Pen, emerged in France in the 70s and 80s, "many of his voters were workers, former voters of communist and socialist parties in historical communist and socialist strongholds."
The same has recently happened in Portugal, where "Chega" (which means "Enough" in Portuguese) has won in 2024 and 2025 in historical strongholds of the Communist Party of Portugal (PCP) or the Socialist Party (PS) in the Algarve or Alentejo. No expert dares to predict what will happen in the future: if the wave will continue to grow and change the liberal model or if it will diminish.
Several agree that these movements are characterized by being "very volatile" and sometimes based on strong leadership, so they can emerge and disappear, as was the case with "Golden Dawn" in Greece.