"With the escalation in its irregular warfare by land, sea, and air, Russia's 'below the threshold' actions [of war] could challenge NATO's collective defense doctrine sooner rather than later," wrote Edward Arnold, an analyst at the British think tank RUSI (Royal United Services Institute), in his report How could the Kremlin test collective defense? on January 2. On August 29, the same expert noted that "since that article was published, the Kremlin has become bolder."
Yesterday, in an email to EL MUNDO, Arnold explained that with the drone strikes on Poland, "Putin wants to demonstrate strength and, probably, test NATO's determination." According to Arnold, the unmanned aircraft - 19 in total, with four shot down - are just another step in Russia's escalation in its confrontation with Western Europe.
This confrontation seems destined to continue, as it is how Vladimir Putin has been expanding his borders since launching the invasion of northern Georgia in 2008: a constant irregular war, combining direct actions with various sabotage and interference in the internal affairs of countries to create division. The signals are contradictory, increasing the opponent's confusion and exacerbating their divisions.
Yesterday's action fits perfectly into that strategy because, as Arnold explains, "the escalation is intertwined with discussions between the Russians and the United States about a possible ceasefire and peace in Ukraine." Amidst this, Russia has launched what could be considered its most aggressive move against a country outside its sphere of influence since blockading Berlin in 1947.
Most European leaders in NATO (not so much the Americans, especially since Donald Trump's arrival at the White House) have stated that Russia will be able to test Article 5 of the Atlantic Alliance, which establishes that aggression against a member state will be considered an attack against all, within a period of three to five years. That means as early as 2028.
However, testing NATO's political will does not necessarily have to be a full-scale invasion like the one Ukraine has been enduring since 2014. Additionally, it is very difficult to imagine Russia engaging in a conventional war against a NATO country after the unequivocal disaster of its Armed Forces in Ukraine. Three and a half years after invading the country in what was expected to be a war lasting at most ten days, Russian forces have barely advanced 70 kilometers into Ukraine. It's as if, after 43 months of invasion, France was only at the gates of Girona.
Given this failure, Putin could opt for an operation similar to the first invasion of Ukraine 12 years ago when the "little green men" - as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred to them - without insignias or uniforms, seized Crimea with the help of biker gangs, while alleged miners from Donetsk and Lugansk skillfully operated tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft missiles. Obviously, this is more challenging to execute in a NATO country. However, the Kremlin's ability to exploit internal divisions within countries is well proven.
Alternatively, it could be an isolated incident. The fact that 19 drones entered Polish airspace and only four were shot down signals the vulnerability of defense systems against cheap technologies that can be used en masse. The recent war between Iran and Israel is a prime example. Despite having the world's best missile defense, Israel, with Patriot and THAAD missile batteries operated by U.S. soldiers, U.S. fighter jets patrolling the region for missiles, and five U.S. destroyers - some based in Rota - intercepting Iranian missiles, 14% of Iranian projectiles penetrated all these defenses and hit Israel, according to the Defense specialized consultancy Forecast International. Furthermore, as the conflict prolonged, Iran's missiles gained precision, and one of the reasons, according to U.S. sources, the war ended was because Israel was running out of ammunition for its defensive systems like Iron Dome and David's Sling.
The technological gap between the Israel-United States alliance and Iran - which has moderate but not enthusiastic support from China - is much greater than that between NATO and Russia. This is not due to Moscow's Soviet legacy, which may not be of much use today but has left it with a tradition of engineering and a vast arsenal, but because Russia is now almost a delegate of the other great superpower: China. This was declared in July at the Aspen Institute's Security Forum by the Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Brae, referring to the war in Ukraine, stating that "Russia would have lost without the help China provided." Beijing is far ahead of Europe - and on par with the United States - in artificial intelligence, satellites, missiles, fighter jets, and overall warfare capabilities. Therefore, everything would depend on how much and in what way Beijing would be willing to assist Moscow.
All of this also hinges on political will. Although speculation about a possible conflict between Russia and the West always focuses on Finland, the Baltic countries, and Poland, there are many more fronts. It is no coincidence that the most modern nuclear aircraft carrier in the U.S. fleet, the Gerald Ford, spent from August 23 to September 8 in the Arctic Ocean, leading a NATO flotilla near the Svalbard archipelago.
Unless there is a freak who enjoys vacationing to see whales and polar bears, few have ever heard of Svalbard, an archipelago as large as Aragon and Extremadura combined but with only 2,800 inhabitants, located at the same distance from the geographic North Pole as the straight-line distance between Cadiz and Barcelona. Stationing an ultra-modern aircraft carrier there may not seem to make much sense, but Svalbard is a very special place. Until 1920, it belonged to no one. Since then, it has been Norwegian, on the condition that it remains demilitarized and that Russia can exploit its natural resources. In 2024, a Russian mission arrived with a Chinese delegation to explore the peculiar idea of building a theme park there, at the Pole, utilizing the facilities of the Pyramiden mine, which was under Russian ownership until 1998 when it had to be abandoned for a significant reason in the region: the heating system broke down.