"The international community is concerned about the possibility that the expiration of the New START may have negative impacts on the international arms control regime and the global nuclear order," said Lin Jian, spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the official conclusion of the last agreement that limited strategic nuclear weapons between the United States and Russia.
For the first time in decades, the world is left without a framework limiting the nuclear deployment of the two powers that hold nearly 90% of the world's arsenal. The immediate consequence is uncertainty as the threat of a new global arms race looms.
In this context, China's role becomes central. Beijing has increased its nuclear arsenal faster than any other country since the end of the Cold War, challenging the narrative of strategic stability that has prevailed since then. While Washington and Moscow have occasionally sat down to negotiate numbers, Beijing has maintained a lower profile, always refusing to participate in trilateral talks.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in 2024 China had around 600 nuclear warheads, compared to over 3,700 for the United States and 4,300 for Russia.
This figure marks a significant increase: in 2012, when Xi Jinping came to power, China had only 240 warheads. If current trends continue, the Asian country could reach 1,000 warheads or more by 2030, according to Pentagon estimates and international analysts.
U.S. President Donald Trump has insisted that China join a disarmament framework with Washington and Moscow. "The nuclear forces of China and the United States are by no means at the same level, and it is not fair or reasonable to ask China to join the negotiations at this stage," spokesperson Lin Jian declared this week.
Beijing's position is clear: its arsenal remains much smaller than that of the superpowers, both in terms of the number of warheads and launch capability.
However, experts point out that the current growth of the Chinese arsenal is not only quantitative. In recent years, the Asian giant has developed the ability to project nuclear weapons from air, land, and sea, including intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory.
In a grand military parade held in Beijing last September to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, the People's Liberation Army displayed several nuclear-capable missiles, marking the first time it publicly showcased its complete nuclear triad.
One of the highlights of that display was the DF-5C, a key piece of China's strategic deterrence. It is a liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile with an estimated range that can exceed 20,000 kilometers, with the capacity to carry multiple warheads. Also shown were some strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs) with JL3 missiles, which have intercontinental range and allow for launches from deep sea.
Since its first nuclear detonation in 1964, Beijing has maintained the so-called No First Use (NFU) policy, committing not to use nuclear weapons except in response to a nuclear attack. In its Defense White Paper, it reinforces this stance: China will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states or nuclear-free zones, and only seeks the minimum capabilities necessary to ensure its national security.
The Pentagon has pointed out on several occasions that the Chinese arsenal is growing not only in quantity but also in sophistication, with increasingly more missiles that can overcome modern missile defenses and project power over long distances. In addition to the increase in warheads and missiles, Washington claims that Beijing is building hundreds of ICBM silos, underground structures designed to store and launch intercontinental ballistic missiles.
A couple of years ago, the Chinese military demonstrated its power by testing an intercontinental ballistic missile for the first time in 44 years during a launch in the Pacific. The test showed the accelerated pace of Beijing's arsenal modernization, as it has ceased to be a secondary player on the nuclear chessboard.