NEWS
NEWS

Xi Jinping stays out of the conflict in the Middle East and capitalizes on Trump's bellicosity

Updated

The Asian giant reaffirms itself as a stabilizing actor in such a tumultuous geopolitical context

Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Chinese President Xi Jinping.AP

On one of China's state TV news programs, while reporting the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Jamenei in the attacks by the United States and Israel, a local analyst they connected with live reiterated the mantra increasingly repeated by Chinese diplomacy: Beijing does not provoke wars, does not export revolutions, and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

"In a world weary of a Donald Trump who turns every international crisis into a personal showdown, China behaves like the adult in the room among superpowers," defended an editorial in the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party.

During the first two days of the conflict, Beijing maintained a low profile, issuing brief statements urging an immediate halt to military operations. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi escalated the rhetoric on Monday during a conversation with his Iranian counterpart, stating that his country "values the traditional friendship" with Tehran and that it "supports Iran in defending its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity".

Wang initiated talks with other ministers from Russia, Qatar, and France, expressing that the urgent priority should be to "prevent the conflict from spreading further." Simultaneously, Beijing is working with Moscow at the UN Security Council to promote formal condemnations following the attacks on Iran.

"China sees Iran as an asset, not an ally, which now leads to a calibrated and rhetorical response," comments Daniel Russel, a former senior official at the US State Department who now works as an analyst at the Asia Society Policy Institute think tank. "Chinese leaders don't mind seeing Washington bogged down in the Middle East or Latin America instead of focusing on Asia, but Trump's call for mobilizing the Iranian people strikes a sensitive nerve. The Chinese Communist Party is deeply allergic to any hint of popular revolution," Russel continues, predicting that Beijing will now strengthen its alignment with Vladimir Putin.

A similar analysis is made by Derek Grossman, a professor of International Relations at the Center for the Study of Global Economic Futures, another think tank based in Dubai. "From China's perspective, a sustained conflict between Iran and the US would keep Washington focused on the Middle East. This dynamic would concentrate US military and political attention in that region, giving Beijing greater room for maneuver in the Indo-Pacific, particularly regarding coercive pressure on Taiwan," he opines.

The war in the Middle East has caught Chinese leaders preparing for their annual parliamentary meeting, which begins on Thursday, and is also raising questions about Trump's trip to China, scheduled from March 31 to April 2. What was initially conceived as a trade-focused visit threatens to be overshadowed—or postponed—by the military escalation in the Gulf and its energy implications. Beijing's traditional support for Tehran adds an additional layer of friction to the meeting between Trump and Xi.

Since international sanctions hit Iran's economy, China has been a lifeline for the Islamic Republic. The world's second-largest economy has played an essential role by purchasing nearly 90% of Iranian oil exports, providing a vital injection for the ayatollahs' regime. Beyond the energy sector, both countries signed a 25-year "comprehensive strategic partnership" in 2021, with an estimated Chinese investment of up to $400 billion in infrastructure and telecommunications.

Beijing has also been taking steps to reduce Iran's international political isolation by integrating the country into forums under its influence, such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Tehran, on the other hand, has long sought to build closer military ties. However, Xi's government drew a red line there, avoiding direct arms supplies that could trigger secondary sanctions or strain its relationship with Washington and the Gulf monarchies. Although this did not mean absolute neutrality.

Chinese companies have sent industrial components and dual-use technologies to Iran that could be used in drone and missile programs. It's the calculated ambiguity as always: support to keep the interested partnership alive, but without bearing the political cost of becoming their official arsenal.

With Iran, as with Venezuela and Russia, China has managed to benefit from Western sanctions, taking advantage of discounts to secure massive volumes of crude oil. According to the energy consultancy Kpler, in 2025 China imported around 1.38 million barrels per day of Iranian crude, 13.4% of all its maritime purchases. This oil consistently arrives through the so-called ghost fleet, ships that change flags, turn off their transponders, or conduct ship-to-ship transfers at sea to evade controls and sanctions.

With the current conflict, Beijing's main concern is not losing a few hundred thousand barrels of Iranian oil but rather a prolonged military escalation blocking the Strait of Hormuz, the artery through which nearly 20% of the world's oil flows. This chokepoint carries not only Iranian crude but also that of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, or Iraq, all essential for the Chinese economy.

Despite the uncertainty shaking the energy market, Chinese officials privately assert that the more Washington gets bogged down in open fronts in the Middle East, the more room China will have to position itself as an indispensable economic partner, which is Xi's regime's top priority playing field, where it believes it has an advantage over a distracted Trump focused on war.

China boasts of always keeping all doors open: doing business with Saudi Arabia and Iran; with Israel and the Palestinians; with Russia and the European Union. Its move is to present itself as a neutral actor that does not link investments to political reforms or make human rights a contractual condition, while closing long-term energy deals with Riyadh, technological cooperation with the UAE, port projects in Egypt, and logistical corridors connecting Asia to the Mediterranean.

For years, diplomats and analysts have repeated the same idea: in the Middle East, each US bombing and each new spiral of tension opens an opportunity for Beijing, which deploys diplomacy that speaks the language of development and stability, not military deterrence.