There is a phrase that summarizes the recent military interventions by the US: "If there are problems, call the marines". In recent days, the Trump Administration is increasingly mentioning this unit, an immediate and forceful tool when quick intervention is needed, before escalating to a larger war.
The trap that the ayatollahs have set for their enemies in the Strait of Hormuz requires either an agreement, which is becoming increasingly distant, or an armed intervention in the channel itself to resolve the challenge.
Option 1: Tanker Escort
Escorting tankers with warships is an uncertain solution, because any drone that manages to hit one of those tankers would disrupt the effort, and the fear of new attacks would return the Strait to square one.
Option 2: Paratrooper Operation
Another, much riskier option is to carry out an airborne operation, that is, with paratroopers. The US has already halted all training activities of the 82nd Airborne Division, indicating their imminent deployment. This unit is the same one that parachuted into Normandy 24 hours before the major landing in WWII. The problem is that such massive airborne missions have not been seen since the capture of the Suez Canal in 1956 due to their high risk. After 1956, there were more, but they were always limited or unsuccessful, like the Russian airborne troops' attempt to capture the Hostomel airport by helicopters during the early hours of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Option 3: Landing on the Southern Coast and Islands
So, the real option on the table is a landing on the southern coast and islands. Although military analysts warn of the dangers: Iran has all the strategic advantages to defend that shore of the Strait. Many have searched history to find an operation in a similar geographical context: the Battle of Gallipoli.
The Gallipoli campaign was an allied attempt during WWI to open a route to Russia by taking the straits controlled by the Ottoman Empire. The plan, largely driven by Winston Churchill when he was First Lord of the Admiralty, began with a failed naval attack and resulted in a bloody landing on the peninsula of the same name in April 1915. British, French, and Australian troops faced a well-organized Ottoman defense and extremely unfavorable terrain, turning the operation into a slaughter for months, with huge casualties and no decisive advances.
Finally, the allies evacuated in late 1915 and early 1916. The failure severely damaged Churchill's career, leading to his resignation, and stood as a classic example of poor strategic planning and underestimation of the enemy.
Similarities with the Turkish Peninsula
How does this stretch of the southern coast of Iran resemble the Turkish peninsula? In Gallipoli, the allied troops had to land on narrow beaches dominated by heights from which defenders could easily fire upon them. Something similar happens on the southern coast of Iran: steep stretches, mountainous areas very close to the sea, and limited access. Those who land are exposed and channeled, with no room to maneuver. It's all advantages for Iran. In other words, landing on small beaches surrounded by cliffs, with no hiding places and having to fight uphill without water, relying on precarious logistics. Even worse is trying to take Qeshm Island, a natural fortress full of salt caves whose closest military reference is Iwo Jima, the island full of caves and tunnels that the Japanese defended fiercely.
The Ottomans knew the terrain and had fortified it. Iran has been preparing that coastal strip of the Gulf for decades with a similar logic: defensive positions, coastal missiles, mines, and surveillance, integrated into an area denial doctrine. Gallipoli ended in a long, costly campaign with no clear objectives achieved. Analysts fear something similar: even if the initial landing were successful, maintaining and expanding a beachhead against a well-prepared enemy could lead to a protracted war with no quick way out.
The US has already begun demolishing the coastal defenses in southern Iran, as announced by CENTCOM, their central command. On Wednesday, they destroyed artillery positions, launchers, and bunkers in anticipation of a possible landing operation in the area to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. This is usually the preliminary step to assess the potential battlefield.
"Serious Risks of Escalation and Attrition"
Anthony H. Cordesman, analyst at the Center for Strategic Studies, states that "any attempt to project large-scale forces in the Gulf against a prepared Iranian defense would face serious risks of escalation and attrition in a confined combat space." Michael Knights, analyst at the Washington Institute's Near East Policy Institute, believes that "the geography of the Gulf favors Iran's defensive strategy, especially along its coast, where it can concentrate fire against naval and amphibious forces."
Naval expert Bryan Clark asserts that "in the Strait of Hormuz, US forces would operate within Iranian firing range, where even small and dispersed systems can impose significant costs."
The US had developed a plan to take the Strait of Hormuz in the 1980s. The commanders of the US Central Command made their calculations 40 years ago and estimated that 6,000 marines would be needed spread across several islands. The plan was to first take Larak, Hormuz, and Qeshm. Then, small landing groups would take the rest of the islets. Today, that plan, with current drone technology, would be suicidal.