In early March, more than a week after the United States and Israel launched their first attacks on Iran, Chinese special envoy for Middle East affairs, Zhai Jun, embarked on a diplomatic tour of Gulf countries with an objective described in Beijing as low-key and pragmatic: to contain damage. It was not so much about extinguishing a warlike fire as it was about preventing the flames from reaching China's strategic interests in the region, especially its energy dependence and trade routes. Chinese diplomatic sources then acknowledged that the immediate priority was to negotiate with Iranian officials the safe passage of Chinese oil tankers through the Straits of Hormuz.
Zhai's first stop on the tour, a 71-year-old veteran diplomat with a career as ambassador to Libya and France, was Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, from Beijing, Foreign Minister Wang Yi engaged in intense diplomatic phone calls with his counterparts in Iran, Israel, Russia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates. The official message emphasized China's role as a responsible power and promoter of stability. However, in practice, the profile was low. Beijing avoided excessive exposure in a conflict where its influence, especially over Iran, could become a double-edged sword: useful for pressure, but risky if it failed.
That calculation changed on March 31. That day, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar landed in Beijing, a country that had unexpectedly emerged as a central axis in mediating between Tehran and Washington. All conversations and indirect negotiations were going through Islamabad, which sought strategic synchronization with China.
Dar's visit to Beijing was not merely ceremonial. According to some observers, it represented a deliberate attempt by Islamabad to avoid being pigeonholed as a mere messenger for Washington. Chinese support added political weight to the mediation. As international relations expert Rabia Akhtar from the University of Lahore pointed out, Beijing's endorsement provided "political cover, diplomatic weight, and broader Asian legitimacy" at a time when the war was disrupting not only regional security but also global supply chains.
During that visit, Dar and his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, announced a joint five-point initiative to end the conflict. The deliberately ambiguous document called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, resumption of dialogue, and the reopening of the Straits of Hormuz. It did not contain specific commitments but indicated that Beijing was willing to assume a more visible role.
The real test came this week. After Donald Trump's ultimatum to Iran, Pakistan intensified its diplomatic efforts by conveying to Tehran that the United States would sign a temporary truce in exchange for the reopening of Hormuz. However, according to Pakistani officials in recent hours, the Islamic Republic remained reluctant to commit to a ceasefire. In Tehran, there was distrust of Washington, and sectors of the Revolutionary Guard, the main military force, were opposed to negotiations. This version contradicted the later statement by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who claimed that Iran had "begged" for a ceasefire.
For hours, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir held simultaneous contacts with both sides. On one hand, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Vice President JD Vance, and special envoy to the region, Steve Witkoff. On the other hand, with Iranian Parliament President Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
There were no significant breakthroughs until, at the end of the day, China entered the scene through its representative Zhai Jun. According to diplomatic sources from the Asian giant, after a meeting in Beijing with French Ambassador Bertrand Lortholary, Zhai, along with other senior officials from his country, began to press their Tehran counterparts insistently to accept a two-week ceasefire and also Pakistan's proposal to hold the first face-to-face negotiations in Islamabad.
"A ray of hope has emerged for the ceasefire and negotiations", Pakistani leader Sharif told his cabinet at that time, as reported in The Guardian. Beijing had committed to act as a guarantor that the United States would accept some of the 10 points proposed by Iran (including the lifting of all sanctions and the release of frozen Iranian assets), in addition to ensuring the security of Iranian representatives participating in negotiations in Islamabad.
Finally, Trump announced the bilateral ceasefire, acknowledging Pakistan's central role in the mediation. Hours later, the US President himself brought China into the equation by stating that he believed Beijing had persuaded Iran to negotiate.
Iranian officials confirmed this to the New York Times on Wednesday. Iranian Ambassador to Beijing, Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, also stated on Thursday that his country had been engaged in dialogue and close cooperation with friendly countries, especially with China.
Unlike Washington or Islamabad, Beijing could speak with Tehran from a position of significant tangible economic influence. Since the imposition of international sanctions, China has become the main economic support of the Islamic Republic, absorbing approximately 90% of its oil exports. This is in addition to the cooperation agreement signed in 2021, with a duration of 25 years, which includes investments in key sectors such as infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications. In the midst of the war, this framework was at risk.
For weeks, international analysts have highlighted the paradox of the Xi Jinping regime. A prolonged conflict weakened Washington at a sensitive time but also jeopardized China's energy supply. In the end, Beijing's response was pragmatic: to intervene discreetly.