NEWS
NEWS

The first conventional war that the United States may not win since Korea

Updated

So far, Washington has only failed in guerrilla wars, especially in Vietnam and Afghanistan

Associated Press photographer Nick Ut in Vietnam.
Associated Press photographer Nick Ut in Vietnam.AP

If the war in the Middle East were to end as the situation stands now, this would be the worst conventional conflict outcome for the United States since its existence.

Iran would have achieved all its objectives. Israel and the United States none. That is why Tehran's strategy is to maintain the status quo because a dictatorship can endure much longer than two democracies. The Afghan Taliban's phrase to the Americans, "you have the watches, but we have the time," is being applied again.

In its 250 years of existence, the United States has never lost a conventional war, that is, a conflict between States using traditional weapons, tactics, and armed forces. The failures have always been in guerrilla wars or insurgencies, especially in Vietnam and Afghanistan. In wars between States, Washington has only tied twice. And one, with nuances. It was the conflict of 1812 against the United Kingdom, which culminated in the burning of the White House by the British and the failure in their attempt to conquer what is now Canada (an entanglement that Donald Trump seems to want to undo almost two centuries later). But that was not the main objective of the US, which, in return, achieved the annihilation of two major indigenous confederations allied with London, opening the doors to the Westward expansion.

The other case, Korea, is more complex. Because there, just like with Iran in 2026, and as it happened with Iraq and Afghanistan two decades ago, Washington constantly changed its objectives in the conflict. First, it was about defending the southern half of the country; then, conquering the north; next, saving the south again; and finally, maintaining the separation line between both countries. The conflict also became complicated because what started as a war against North Korea turned into another against China and the USSR. Only the death of Stalin allowed the armistice that still holds today. In Korea, literally, three years of war served to leave things as they were and freeze a conflict for 73 years. This is something the world cannot afford today with Iran.

However, in this war, the Israeli-American coalition, later joined by Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, has not achieved any of the demands set by American negotiators Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff (respectively, Trump's son-in-law and friend): for Iran to abandon its nuclear and long-range missile programs, and to stop supporting its allies in the region (Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iran's Shiite militias, and the Houthis in Yemen). For now, Iran maintains its nuclear and defense programs intact. Regarding its allies, "these are groups that operate with varying degrees of autonomy from Tehran, so each case is different, but the war is not weakening the ties," explains former British ambassador and senior researcher at the Washington-based Center for Defense of Democracies, Edmund Fitton-Brown.

The US demanded strategic submission from Iran without offering anything in return. And Tehran had good reasons not to give in. Its neighbor and declared enemy, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, disarmed under Washington's pressure in the nineties, only to face a US invasion in 2003 that cost him power and his life. The Islamic Republic itself has had similar experiences. In 2003, it reached an agreement with the UK, Germany, and France to temporarily suspend its nuclear enrichment program. Two years later, Iran abandoned the understanding, tired of the Europeans seeing the "temporary" suspension as something that could be indefinitely extended.

In 2018, the US unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 agreement, negotiated by Washington itself, under which Iran froze its military nuclear program for three decades. According to the then UK ambassador to Washington, Kim Darroch, it was "an act of diplomatic vandalism for ideological and personal reasons: it was Obama's agreement."

This explains Iran's military reaction. "Tehran has surprised many just as the opening of Soviet archives in 1992 surprised NATO," explains Phillip Cornell, a researcher at the Atlantic Council think tank who previously worked at NATO and the International Energy Agency. "While NATO was making scenarios about escalations and de-escalations, the USSR had barely designed plans beyond the concept of total war. All or nothing. Something similar has happened with Iran. That country is controlling the escalation but has made it clear that the economic, energy, and financial infrastructure of the region is very vulnerable, and that it has the means to render it useless. That has been enough," he concludes.

Tehran has shown a much higher military capability than expected. It has decentralized its operations centers, making it impossible to decapitate its military forces. With Chinese satellite intelligence and targets designated by Russian satellites, and applying the teachings of its ally Vladimir Putin in the bombings against Ukraine, Iran has destroyed 288 American targets, including highly sophisticated radars. By spreading terror throughout the Middle East's oil infrastructure, it has forced US naval forces to refuel through tankers at sea, complicating logistics. Additionally, the US has expended such a quantity of weapons - especially cruise and anti-missile missiles - that it now has to save what remains for a possible conflict with China. Replenishing stocks will take two to three years.

Like in Korea, the US has changed its objectives and has not ruled out the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. And, as if that were not enough, the goals of its great ally, Israel, have always been much more ambitious, including persistently advocating for regime change.

It is too much ambition for an aerial war. In fact, there is only one case where an exclusively air intervention achieved strategic objectives in a conflict, but in a completely different time and context, when in 1999 NATO, after 78 days of bombings, forced Serbia to abandon Kosovo.

This is how this week has led to the statements of Greek shipowner Evangelos Marinakis, owner of 35 supertankers, to the Financial Times, declaring himself in favor of paying the toll that Tehran allegedly demands from ships crossing the Strait of Hormuz, which is supposed to amount to two million dollars in bitcoin, a cryptocurrency paradoxically favored by Donald Trump that is almost impossible to detect. The war, therefore, is in danger of becoming, at best, the third tie in the 250 years of US military history.