The abrupt end of the ceasefire between Trump and the ayatollahs does not take us back to square one, but to a worse place. The US President stated on 38 occasions since February 28 that the agreement with Iran was close to being finalized, but the reality is that the positions were always far apart, and the wait has made Iran feel even stronger. The blond president repeatedly claimed that the regime wanted "a quick agreement," but he was revealing his own intentions. Faced with this stance, Tehran's negotiators, the toughest diplomats in the world, opposed their delaying tactics, knowing that they have an economic nuclear weapon activated: the Strait of Hormuz. This Thursday, Trump once again ordered the attacks to stop, restarting the cycle.
The miscalculation of declaring war on the Tehran regime thinking it would surrender or fall during the first days of bombings already has serious consequences for the global economy, for US missile arsenals that have been depleted, and for mutual trust, which no longer exists. The ayatollahs want to humiliate the White House, and the White House cannot afford an Iran with atomic sovereignty.
Tehran has a lever it has never needed to activate: the closure of Hormuz. This gives them a negotiating position infinitely stronger than any US bombing because the cost of not reaching a pact for the global economy is enormous and visible, while the regime can withstand terrible bombings for months. Paradoxically, this also makes an agreement more difficult: Iran does not want to release that card of the Strait without absolute guarantees, and Washington cannot give absolute guarantees without seeming to have succumbed to military pressure. Both want to end the war but are trapped in irreconcilable positions.
What does Iran not want? To sign an agreement perceived as surrendering to the US. That would destroy the narrative of resistance that has sustained the regime for 45 years. The hardliners in Tehran - the Revolutionary Guards, their terrifying security apparatus - are the most powerful internally and the most opposed to any concession. With the decapitation of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his closest collaborators, they are now the ones in charge. And they are even more radical than their predecessors.
What can't Donald Trump sign? The tycoon has Netanyahu whispering in his ear. The Israeli Prime Minister does not want any agreement that leaves Iran with residual nuclear capacity and will do anything to continue the war. Every time negotiations approach an understanding, Israel takes some action - an attack, a leak, a statement - that derails the process. Trump cannot close a deal with Iran that Israel rejects.
A real agreement would have to simultaneously address the nuclear program, the reopening of Hormuz, the lifting of sanctions, security guarantees for the regime, the role of pro-Iranian militias in the region (Hezbollah, Houthis, militias in Iraq), and the normalization of relations. Resolving any of these fronts separately could take months. Attempting all these fronts at once in a few weeks is practically impossible.
University of Chicago professor Robert A. Pape, who has been arguing from the start that Trump has gotten himself into an escalation trap, states: "Three months ago, I argued that air power would not collapse Iran. Two months ago, I argued that survival would create influence. Today, the ceasefire is crumbling, and the war is entering another phase."
So, is negotiation possible at this time? What we have seen in recent months has not really been negotiation but conflict management. Both parties have incentives to keep tension under control - neither wants total war - but also incentives not to concede enough to reach a real agreement. The most likely outcome is exactly what we are seeing: a fragile ceasefire that breaks every few days, negotiations that advance and retreat, and no definitive solution in sight.
Right now, a military escalation is more likely than an agreement. The war did not decide a winner and it is possible that there isn't one.