There are two questions that are repeated every day in the United States, in Congress, the White House, or on television sets, and that rarely receive a direct answer from the elite of the Republican Party. The first is whether Joe Biden won the 2020 elections. The second, if the United States would fulfill its commitments and defend a European country, for example, one of the Baltics, in the event of a Russian invasion. Both issues are at the core of the democratic system and the international system that emerged after World War II, two basic, non-negotiable pillars without which almost nothing makes sense. And yet, Donald Trump's leadership has made it impossible to answer them clearly. The first, for fear of retaliation from those who still claim he won and was robbed. The second, because no one knows for sure, and twisted predicates are chosen instead of assuming what would mean breaking the only thing that sustains the Alliance, the promise of collective defense.
Jana Puglierin and the experts at the European Council on Foreign Relations have coined the term "the Schrödinger's NATO" to define the current state of international relations, in which "the United States seems to be committed to the Alliance and, at the same time, absent from it." Trump, since his first term, "has been unusually consistent in pointing out that the United States has stopped guaranteeing the security of Europe and has shown little interest in confronting Russia," but at the same time, "in practice, NATO remains the backbone of European security and the United States still provides the majority of the Alliance's operational force, as approximately 75,000 U.S. soldiers remain deployed in Europe and the NATO's top military leader is American," according to their report for this week's summit.
Among European diplomats these days, there is deep concern, and the fact that on Saturday, the same day his country celebrated its 250th anniversary, Trump spoke on the phone for over an hour with Vladimir Putin (who then attacked Kiev, killing more innocent civilians) does not help. NATO summits used to be a mere staging of unity and harmony, with ministers and heads of government simply signing what had been negotiated and agreed upon for months in offices. Not anymore.
Each meeting is a big question mark, another possibility for everything to blow up, for reproaches, accusations, fights. "I just want your loyalty," said the American, flanked by Mark Rutte last week when asked what he expected from the meeting, admitting that he probably would not attend if Erdogan did not organize it. Trump remains furious with the Europeans for their lack of involvement in the Iran war, and his personality is not exactly known for forgiveness. This meeting is not about numbers, not even words, but settling scores.
For 31 countries and leaders, the meeting is essential in collective terms and perhaps to smooth out some specific bilateral disputes. For Trump, however, it is a matter (like everything he does and surrounds himself with) of a personal nature. Another opportunity to demonstrate that he is the world leader, the center of attention, that everything revolves around him. He has used previous summits to call his allies freeloaders, to shout at Pedro Sánchez or Angela Merkel in the room. To elbow his way to the front row of a photo. This time will be no different, and his messages on social media attacking Giorgia Meloni again, joking that he may need a "restraining order" are the best example.
Trump believes that his fame and respect are cemented when he goes to London, Paris, Beijing. Or now, to Ankara, where he will have private meetings with Erdogan, Volodimir Zelenski, and the Syrian President, Ahmed al-Sharaa. The rest have prepared as best as one can for the unpredictable, streamlining the agenda, approving a very short declaration for the second year in a row. "And praying a lot," adds an allied diplomatic source.
The experts' baseline scenario is that Trump will use the trip to Turkey to continue pressuring European allies to see how far they are willing to go to meet his demands that they take on a greater share of defense spending and more responsibilities, but without Washington losing control, something he has made clear in countless interviews, statements, and in his national security and defense strategies. At the core is the fulfillment of the goal to invest 5% of GDP in defense and capabilities before 2035, as agreed in The Hague last year, with Spain's dissenting position, the only country that has said it will not need to reach or reach those levels to fulfill its obligations and commitments.
Trump also seeks to increase industrial production of weapons and ammunition within NATO and to continue selling equipment. One of the most important aspects is the possible sale of F-35 fighters to Turkey, something that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has criticized in recent hours. Erdogan wants to rejoin the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II program and buy these planes, and the Donald Trump Administration has signaled its desire to improve relations and is considering this possibility. But it is complicated because the country still operates the Russian S-400 Triumf air defense system, which was the reason Washington expelled Ankara from the program in 2019.
"The initial consensus reached by the 32 allies regarding the summit declaration suggests that President Trump will not discard it on a whim, as he did with the G-7 declaration in 2018. Officials expect the constructive spirit of this year's G-7 meeting in Evian, including support for Ukraine, to extend to Ankara. However, they also admit that much depends on his mood that day," explains Oana Lungescu, a long-time NATO spokesperson. "Therefore, despite NATO's best-laid plans, the summit could provide Trump with a platform to reprimand other leaders, particularly Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, or outgoing UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer, whom he has recently criticized."
"The problem lies in arbitrariness," points out Sophia Besch of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in a think tank text on the summit. "Pentagon officials have been quite clear in their push for burden-sharing and the so-called NATO 3.0. However, when U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently announced a specific force distribution review for Europe, similar to an assessment, he suggested that reductions would be based on a system of rewards and punishments for allies considered 'good' and 'bad,' rather than changes in the U.S. threat assessment (or even cost considerations). But what constitutes a good ally seems to be determined by policy and not just defense spending (...) Those expecting the summit to bring clarity will likely be disappointed," she warns.