The Chinese car factory SAIC Motor has chosen the port of Ferrol to establish its first plant in Spain. There was a possibility for this project to materialize in Vigo or Gijón, but ultimately the Chinese closed an agreement to do it at the entrance of the estuary, a short distance from the military arsenal of Ferrol, a key port for the Navy, mooring and maintenance point for the F-100 Frigates and the Supply Ships C.
In addition, in that port, there is a shipyard Navantia, with a direct workforce of 1,885 employees and a total impact of 9,000 jobs in the area including auxiliary industry and value chain. It is in that strategic geographical area for the Spanish naval industry where China wants to manufacture vehicles and have their ships transit to take them to other points in Europe.
Although the plans are for the factory to be operational in 2028, all of this worries military sources consulted by this newspaper. So much so that the Ministry of Defense has reports reflecting what both sides see as "a threat." In the military and security world, they only see drawbacks to this project. As learned by this newspaper, Spain runs the risk of the NATO and the European Union no longer considering Ferrol as a safe port. Because Chinese presence at the entrance of the estuary would expose a "systemic rival" - as the European Union defines the Asian giant - to almost daily knowledge of the movements of Spanish frigates and technologies.
There are two types of ships that may interest those of Xi Jinping. On one hand, there are the F-100s, the missile-launching units of the Navy that act as escorts for other types of vessels - mainly aircraft carriers - and of which Spain has five operational: the Álvaro de Bazán, Almirante Juan de Borbón, Blas de Lezo, Méndez Núñez, and Cristóbal Colón.
All of them are based in Ferrol and participate in multinational missions of NATO. For example, the Álvaro de Bazán is on a very demanding 165-day deployment, heading now towards Ecuador after participating in exercises in Hawaii with the U.S. Navy. The Juan de Borbón led until April the NATO Permanent Naval Group number one, while the Blas de Lezo participated on the coasts of United States in Fleetex-250, a multinational exercise commemorating the country's independence.
These ships also have the American Aegis system integrated, which uses powerful radars and computers to track and guide missiles to destroy enemy targets.
On the other hand, there are the frigates of the F-110 class. The F-110 frigate program, whose execution order was signed in 2019 and construction began three years later, contemplates the construction of five units for a total value of 4.325 billion euros. These are versatile escort ships, with anti-aircraft, anti-surface, and anti-submarine capabilities, and can operate in combination with other units.
The first of these frigates, the F-111 Bonifaz, achieved the milestone last May of starting two of its four diesel generators for the first time. If the Chinese factory is located at the entrance of the estuary, it could monitor the navigation test progress of the ships. Additionally, the presence of a Chinese factory could decrease the interest of potential foreign buyers, such as Portugal, Belgium, or the Netherlands.
The Asian giant has had its eyes on European ports for years, both commercial and military. Thus, concern about its presence in critical infrastructures is a fact.
"For years in Europe, we saw the arrival of Chinese capital in our port infrastructures as an economic opportunity. Ports in need of investment after the 2008 financial crisis found in Chinese state-owned companies a partner willing to provide a lot of money when few others were interested. Today, that enthusiasm has given way to distrust," explains a European Union delegation official in Beijing to this newspaper. "What was once seen as a simple commercial operation is now analyzed from a security perspective."
This Chinese expansion officially began in 2013 when President Xi Jinping presented the Belt and Road Initiative, the ambitious project aimed at rebuilding the ancient trade routes that for centuries connected China with Europe. The so-called Maritime Silk Road quickly became one of its fundamental pillars. While trains crossed Central Asia, a true naval highway began to take shape from the South China Sea, crossing the Indian Ocean, bordering Africa, and entering the Mediterranean to reach the main European ports.
The executor of this strategy was Xu Lirong, president and secretary of the Communist Party in Cosco, a dual role that illustrates how large Chinese state-owned companies operate. Under his leadership, the conglomerate has gone from being a shipping company to becoming one of the world's largest port operators. It controls a fleet of over 400 container ships and holds stakes in nearly a hundred ports spread across more than fifty countries. For Beijing, each new terminal acquired means securing the global supply chains through which a large part of the exports that sustain the world's second-largest economy circulate.
The best example of this strategy is found at the gates of Athens. When Greece was on the brink of bankruptcy after the debt crisis, Cosco seized the opportunity to first take over the management and later the majority control of the port of Piraeus.
Beijing often presents the Greek port as proof that its investments generate growth and employment. But for many European officials, this case demonstrated to what extent a strategic asset can fall under the influence of a foreign state whose foreign policy and state-owned companies respond to the interests of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
This experience would also mark the path to Spain. In 2017, Cosco acquired 51% of Noatum Ports, taking control of the terminals in Valencia and Bilbao. ACS had previously sold these assets to a fund managed by JP Morgan, which ended up negotiating their sale with the Chinese company. For Beijing, Valencia was already the largest Spanish container port and one of the best-connected in the Mediterranean, an ideal platform to integrate Spain into the Maritime Silk Road.
Since then, Cosco's ships began to use Valencia as one of their major European logistics centers. The Spanish port now handles even more containers than Piraeus.
Chinese investments extend from the ports of Hamburg to Antwerp, passing through Rotterdam, Genoa, or Marseille. In some cases, Cosco directly controls terminals; in others, it participates through joint ventures with European operators. Other state giants like China Merchants also have acquired stakes in numerous international terminals.
Beijing argues that the project responds only to economic reasons
Portugal appears to be the next major target. The port of Sines, located on the Atlantic coast and Portugal's main maritime infrastructure, has for years attracted the interest of Chinese companies due to its prime location for connecting Europe with the Americas and Africa. However, European officials note that increasingly stringent scrutiny of strategic investments is slowing the influx of Chinese capital into a project that, just a few years ago, seemed poised to become another major achievement for Beijing.
"Our main concern is that excessive reliance on operators linked to the Chinese state could give Beijing a capacity for influence that goes far beyond the economic sphere," officials at the EU delegation in the Chinese capital say. The sources cite NATO reports warning that ports are critical infrastructure where vast amounts of logistics data, the movement of goods, digital management systems, and essential supply chains converge.
"The concern is that this information could prove valuable for intelligence activities or that, in the event of an international crisis, an operator with close ties to the Chinese government could exert pressure on services considered strategic," they explain. In some cases, moreover, concerns are heightened because certain Chinese industrial investments related to port facilities are located near military infrastructure or areas regularly used by allied ships—a scenario that fuels the debate over risks to national security.
From Beijing, Chinese officials insist that their investments are based solely on commercial criteria and point out that many European countries sought Chinese capital during the worst years of the financial crisis. They also argue that the modernization of ports such as Piraeus demonstrates that cooperation "benefits both sides" and that framing any Chinese investment as a security issue "stems more from U.S.-driven geopolitical rivalry than from real threats."