The path to the invasion of Ukraine was paved by a text signed by Vladimir Putin himself. It was published in the Ria Novosti agency in June 2021 and was titled On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians. It stated that the separate Ukrainian identity from the Russian one does not exist organically but has been manufactured by external enemies of Russia, especially the West. The Kremlin went to war months later with a clear objective: the destruction of the Ukrainian state and identity.
Last Friday, the same agency published another text titled Russia faces another special military operation. It will be very short. It was signed by analyst Alexander Nosovich. The article named Lithuania as the new target of Russian aggression and described a future attack with missiles and drones. Interestingly, and unlike Putin's text, it was withdrawn minutes later, but the message was immediately captured in the intended places.
The Russian challenge against Europe, in writing and through its propaganda channels, progresses alongside its aggressiveness on the ground. Daily, Putin's regime provides examples of that destabilization doctrine, but in some cases, the strategy includes a high risk of leading to an armed conflict with unpredictable consequences.
European intelligence agencies have been almost unanimous in warning about the danger of an attack on a NATO country, although the format has changed in recent months. While Polish, German, or French secret services previously placed the aggression beyond 2027, they have all now advanced their worst predictions. It is no longer a matter of years, but of months. From a political and military perspective, several things have changed since their initial assessments. The window of opportunity for Putin is wide open.
TRUMP AND ARTICLE 5
NATO's deterrence is based on making the adversary believe that Article 5 will be automatically activated in the event of an aggression when the attacked country requests it. It literally means: "If one is attacked, we are all attacked." But Trump, much closer to Putin than to many of his former allies, has explicitly questioned this automatism - he even said he would not defend countries that do not pay 2% of GDP on defense - and although the Alliance continues to function institutionally, the Kremlin knows that a limited incursion into the Baltic territory would create a real dilemma in Washington.
Is Trump willing to risk an open war with Russia over the city of Narva, an uninhabited island in the Baltic Sea, or a few drones flying over Paris or Berlin? Washington has repeatedly stated that "Europe's defense is now Europe's responsibility." This can be seen as an invitation to test its true determination.
The US National Security Strategy of 2025 declared that it was time for the European continent to stand on its own feet and assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. This was not empty rhetoric. At a NATO Defense Ministers meeting in June 2026, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced that the Pentagon was moving "quickly and irreversibly" towards a Europe that assumed "primary responsibility for its own defense."
NO DEFENSES AGAINST DRONES AND MISSILES
The US has consumed 80% of its THAAD and 60% of its Patriot missiles in the Persian Gulf. The anti-aircraft batteries that should protect NATO's eastern flank have been relocated to the Middle East. If Russia launches a limited incursion in the Baltics now, NATO would respond with historically low arsenals and production lines that will take years to replenish.
The factories producing anti-aircraft missiles, capable of putting about 600 units on the market per year, are now under pressure: not only does the US need to replenish its arsenals, Europe is also running low after supporting Ukraine itself. Gulf countries, also in dire need, are turning to these same factories to make purchases. Without increasing production, it is impossible to supply everyone. The window of opportunity is now clearer than ever: there is no ammunition to defend.
POLITICAL CRISIS IN THE FRANCO-GERMAN AXIS
Germany is holding elections with the populist AfD as the leading force in several Eastern Länder of the country, with positions favorable to lifting sanctions on Russia and ceasing support to Ukraine. France has Marine Le Pen's National Rally leading the polls for the 2027 presidential elections, with a long history of sympathy towards Moscow. The same can be said for the other pole: Jean-Luc Mélenchon's far-left. A runoff with both parties could be detrimental to support for Kiev.
In other key countries like Poland, Prime Minister Donald Tusk's government is solid but under internal pressure from President Karol Nawrocki, who has already strained relations with Ukraine by resurrecting old controversies several times. In Italy, Giorgia Meloni has surprisingly been pro-Atlanticist since coming to power in 2022, defying expectations of being a pro-Russian populist figure, but also faces a point of structural fragility. The main resistance to helping Ukraine and opposing Russia comes from Matteo Salvini's League, who has questioned the continuity of arms shipments and calls for a reconstruction of relations with Moscow. This pressure has been joined by Roberto Vannacci, a retired general and former MEP of the League, who has created his own populist party: Futuro Nazionale.
EUROPE'S REARMAMENT IS SLOW BUT NOT ETERNAL
The moment could be particularly urgent for Putin if he wants to launch destabilization actions or limited military plans. Europe is rearming faster than expected . Germany has approved the largest defense budget in its history. Poland has the largest conventional army in NATO on continental Europe. The Baltic countries are building strong defensive lines and closing gaps in their most exposed areas.
Strategy and Intelligence analyst Christian Ehrlich put it this way: "The strategic window of six or seven years that Russia calculated it had is closing earlier than expected." If Vladimir Putin wants to act and create chaos, he has to do so before this rearmament produces more powerful armies, with weaponry adapted to the new drone warfare, with professionals trained by Ukrainian instructors seasoned in real combat, which some analysts place between the years 2027 and 2029. It's not that Putin will act with total certainty. It's that he has never had such a favorable window as this fall, and that alone changes his risk calculation.
WINTER AND FATIGUE AS WEAPONS
Every winter since 2022, Russia has intensified bombings against Ukrainian energy infrastructure to punish its civilian population and make Ukrainian cities uninhabitable. This winter arrives without enough Patriot interceptors and with the Ukrainian population in its fifth year of war. If Russia manages to leave Kiev without light and heating in January, as it did in February of last year, the pressure on Zelenski to negotiate under unfavorable conditions increases exponentially. A destabilizing action in Europe at that same moment would divide Western attention between two simultaneous fronts.
Nearly five years of war in Ukraine, the unresolved Iran war, the Ceuta migration crisis, and skyrocketing inflation have eroded popular support for the war effort in several allied countries. Surveys in Germany or Italyalready show majorities preferring negotiation with Russia over escalation. Putin has been betting for years that the West has a limited attention span and will eventually get distracted and tired. The convergence of crises this fall is exactly the scenario Moscow has been waiting for.
Fear is the cheapest and most effective weapon in the Russian arsenal, and Putin has been perfecting its use for years. The strategy is not to win a conventional war against NATO, but to convince European populations that the cost of resisting is greater than that of giving in. Every air raid siren in Poland, every closed airport in Denmark, every mysterious drone is part of a carefully calibrated message: this could reach your cities.